



An Agent Spectrum of Policy Exchange Demand in Decision Making in E-Commerce Setup

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Abstract. This research is about dominance influence of information, interest, preference and choice by an agent in an e-commerce setup. This is termed as “ I^2PC ” Theorem. This research paper is to describe the spectrum of these influencers in policy exchange demand (decision making).

Keywords. *preference, interest, choice, information, agent, demand.*

AN AGENT SPECTRUM OF POLICY EXCHANGE DEMAND IN DECISION MAKING IN E-COMMERCE SETUP.

1 Introduction

The square I is representing first information and the second is the interest. P is the preference and C denotes choice.

“ I^2PC ” Theorem. The dominance influence of information, interest, preference


and choice is Information \rightarrow Interest \rightarrow Preference \rightarrow Choice or

Information $<$ Interest $<$ Preference $<$ Choice.

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1. The pre of choice is the preference.
2. The pre of preference is the interest.
3. The pre of interest is the information.
4. Information is towards the right of choice.

Interest is an information advantage to the preference of policy exchange and preference is an interest preferential to the choice of policy exchange. There is no escaping fact that all effective choices must be made from the informational opportunities to which the consumer has access. The right factors do limit the range of preferences to which an individual has access, do direct attention to some information and away from others, and do affect the information distribution of the population. Most exchanges come from middle-class individuals with middle-class interests and middle-class individuals with middle-class interests and middle-class preferences of middle-class opportunities.



Graph : Demand of Policy Exchange

2 Policy Exchange Demand

The construction of the demand-choice graph is by the horizontal choice plotted versus the price. The demand of policy exchange relates the information size of set quantity of choice(info, int, pre, cho)

demand to price over the range of possible prices. Information demand defined for a set period of time makes the demand of policy exchange schedule-able. The dominance influencers of quantity must be held constant. This is termed the “ceteris paribus” condition. It means that one only look at one relationship at a time. The demand of policy exchange obeys the law of demand. Information demand is towards the right choice. The exchange derivative of demand is the slope of the demand of policy exchange.

Law of Exchange Information: *It states that the exchange information is towards the right of choice.*

For normal goods, an increase in income shifts demand to the right. Changes in the prices of substitutes and complements also shift demand. A substitute is something that takes the place of something else.

Information Substitution: *It is defined by the action of replacing information good with the subset of the information good in a selection process.*

Properties of Information Substitution

1. *The information substitution for normal goods are the interest goods.*
2. *The information substitution for interest goods are the preference goods.*
3. *The substitution of information for preference goods are the choice goods.*
4. *The information goods are either a subset or proper subset of the other.*

Mathematically, exchange information substitution is defined by set theory as:

$$(\pi_N C \pi_I) C (\pi_P C \pi_C)$$

$$\pi_{NI} C \pi_{PC} \quad \text{where } \pi: \text{goods, C: subset, c: choice, l: interest, p: preference,}$$

N:normal.

Let $\{\pi_N, \pi_I, \pi_P, \pi_C\}$ be sets.

1. (a) π_N is a subset of π_I , denoted by $\pi_N C \pi_I$ or $\pi_I C \pi_N$, if for each information good, π in π_N and π in π_I .

(b) π_P is a subset of π_C , denoted by $\pi_P C \pi_C$ or $\pi_C C \pi_P$, if for each information good, π in π_P and π in π_C .

2. π_N is equal of π_I , denoted by $\pi_N = \pi_I$ or $\pi_N C \pi_I$, and $\pi_I C \pi_N$, and π_P is equal to π_C denoted by $\pi_P = \pi_C$ if $\pi_P C \pi_C$ and $\pi_C C \pi_P$.

3. π_N is a proper subset π_I , if $\pi_N C \pi_I$ and $\pi_N \neq \pi_I$ and π_P is a proper subset of π_C if $\pi_P C \pi_C$ and $\pi_C C \pi_P$.

4. $\pi_{N|P} C \pi_{I|C}$ if and only if $\pi_{N|P} C \pi_{I|C} = \pi_{I|C}$ and $\pi_{N|P} C \pi_{I|C}$ if and only if $\pi_{N|P} C \pi_{I|C} = \pi_{N|P}$.

A complement is a good that goes with another good.

Information Complementation: It is defined as information goods that go well with a complement of the information goods in a selection process.

The information complementation is defined mathematically as:

Let $\{\pi_N, \pi_I, \pi_P, \pi_C\}$ be sets.

1. The complement of π_I relative to π_N denoted $\pi_N \setminus \pi_I$ is defined as

$$\pi_N \setminus \pi_I = \{\pi E \pi_N : \pi E \neq \pi_I\}.$$

This means that good of normal goods are not also member goods of information goods but such good does complement the other.

2. The complement of π_C relative to π_P denoted $\pi_P \setminus \pi_C$ is defined as

$$\pi_P \setminus \pi_C = \{\pi E \pi_P : \pi E \neq \pi_C\}.$$

This means that good of preference goods are not also member goods of choice goods but such good does complement the other.

3. $\pi_N \setminus \pi_N = \emptyset$ and $\pi_N \setminus \emptyset = \pi_N$. N can also be I, P, C.

3 Conclusion

The dominance influence is directed from information to choice. In that direction, information is towards interest, interest is towards preference and finally preference is towards choice. In relation to dominance influence, it is clear that information is less than interest, interest is less than preference and preference is less than choice. Choice is the greater influence on dominance relationships. Information is the least on the spectrum of dominance relation in policy exchange demand. In this article, properties of information substitution are enumerated. The term information complementation is made and as well as complement goods.

Further Reading

1. Frank Appiah (2021). A Composite Theory of Policy Exchange Choice. Easychair Preprint
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3. Frank Appiah (2021). Exchange Outcome of an Organization Based on Motivational Agents. EasyChair Preprint no. 4863
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