



Peace Process between El Salvador and Honduras (1980): A Perspective About the External Actors

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Abstract

This article speaks about the peace process between El Salvador and Honduras in three moments. Establish the incidence or contributions of the organizations and other international actors in terms of migration and human rights to the development of the process towards the General Peace Treaty between Honduras and El Salvador, which ended the conflict and tensions of 1969-1980. The first moment talks about, from 1969 to 1980 process base on realism and liberalism theoretical frameworks; the second talks about the international character of the conflict; and the third, about Human rights and migration from ethics perspectives. Seeks to analyze how was the process towards the Peace Treaty and the Role of organizations and other international actors in the peaceful conclusion of the conflict in Honduras and El Salvador between 1969 and 1980 and Establish which were the specific actions that organizations and countries take in terms of human rights in the development of the peace treaty. Also, develop the actions of organizations and countries in terms of migration in the framework of the peace treaty.

“El subdesarrollo de América Latina no es una etapa del desarrollo. Es su consecuencia.”

— Eduardo Galeano, *Open Veins of Latin America*

Peace Process between El Salvador and Honduras (1980)

Although, in June 1969, there was an armed conflict that included Honduras and El Salvador, and which began after a soccer game for qualifying the 70' World Cup, the truth is that the erroneous name of "Soccer War", used in the context of journalistic imagination, reflects an equivocal conception about the reason why the countries faced each other, which has served to blur the true causes and ridicule both peoples (Pérez, 2008). In El Salvador and Honduras this event has been known as the "War of the Hundred Hours" or "War of legitimate defense", and its antecedents are based on multiple events that led to a confrontation between the countries. The similarities in terms of political history and a shared

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identity, which were being strengthened through the implementation of regional integration (stopped as a result of the conflict, pausing the development of the Organization of Central American States, ODECA and the Central American Common Market, CACM), did not prevent their multiple disparities and the uneven growth of the economy caused by the CACM (Arancibia, 2016); a territorial conflict of years; internal socio-political problems; and the wave of migrants from Salvador to Honduras looking for opportunities (Pérez, 2008), that escalate tensions to the point of creating a military confrontation that left thousands of victims among the dead, wounded, disappeared and displaced.

In July 1969, as established by Arancibia (2016), after the holding of two soccer matches between the countries, and the subsequent incidents against Honduran players, Honduras appealed to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) requesting an investigation for the attacks committed. While the press increased the pressure, Salvadorans were attacked in Honduras, which caused the exodus of more than 8,000 back to their country, causing the conflict to peak when, on June 26, the countries decided to break relations. Regarding the situation, other actors in the region intervened, trying to solve the conflict through peaceful mediation. Although at the beginning of July the OAS and the United States became involved because of a series of border incidents, the organization's recommendations did not work, as El Salvador insisted on maintaining its military forces in Honduran territory, and only the sanctions achieved that the Salvadoran militia withdrew.

At this point, a long process towards negotiation began, which, due to internal problems in both countries, did not progress during several years. However, the incidents caused in 1976 led to the mobilization of troops to the border, for which the Managua Act was approved and the group of OAS Military Observers was formed, thanks to the meeting of Central American foreign ministers and their chiefs of the General Staff. Finally, on October 30, 1980, the General Peace Treaty between Honduras and El Salvador was signed, even though their border situation was only defined until 1992. Therefore, we can consider that this process was largely surrounded by the international community, especially by regional organizations, such as the OAS, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) and countries of the region as mediators.

Problematic

In 1969, Honduras and El Salvador had a confrontation, from that moment on, there were multiple elements that caused an escalation in the conflict between these two countries, which was based on “the lack of delimitation of the maritime and land border between both States” (Arancibia, 2016), which implied a historical conflict. In this sense, the objectives of each of the parties were rooted in either territorial expansion, as in the case of El Salvador, or the defense of the territory, as in Honduras.

The political and social reality of the parties must be considered to understand the causes of the conflict and the perception that both countries had of it, since Bowman (2002) has managed to establish that, to a large extent, this type of confrontation occur as a product of internal political instability, beyond a genuine manifestation of external threats to national security.

After the fall of Maximiliano Hernández Martínez in 1944, until the creation of a democratic government, thanks to the communication of multiple political actors in 1950, El Salvador witnessed years of political and electoral instability, with the Army as the main

protagonist. However, in the 50's, when the Constituent Assembly and presidential elections were held, where Oscar Osorio was elected, the country advanced along the path of modernizing the economic system, creating new infrastructures, and energizing the market, thanks to the preponderance of the price of coffee at this time. In 1956, José María Lemus assumed power, but the resistance by the military and trade unions caused a new coup in 1960, with the government of civilians and soldiers, which would lead to new elections, in which Julio Adalberto was elected. Rivera, who would govern until 1967, created an environment of political and social stability, within the framework of economic expansion and hand in hand with the Central American Common Market. After this government, Fidel Sánchez Hernández would rise to power, and assume the local consequences of the Cuban Revolution, which brought with it new demands and the appearance of paramilitary groups, created with the purpose of maintaining order in rural areas, alongside and the already existing 'cantonal patrols'.

The political process in Honduras was quite similar, due to the military influence in both countries. In 1957 elections were held for the General Assembly, which elected the new president, Ramón Villeda Morales. A new Constitution was created, whose moderate reformism led to a coup, thanks to the possible effects of the Agrarian reform and the Labor Code that the military, businessmen and landowners, considered that could lead to the loss of guarantees in terms of respect to the popular caused by a supposed communist infiltration in the institutions. Thus, in 1963, Oswaldo López Arellano assumed power, beginning a period of military governments until 1980, which brought with it the persecution of guerrilla groups and the creation of a wave of popular struggle, which ended in government concessions, due to the imminence of war (Arancibia, 2016).

The causes of the conflict are multiple, so its enumeration is necessary: The geographic border was key, because by 1969, El Salvador and Honduras had not been able to clearly define their borders. Additionally, these were not adequately guarded, which facilitated cross-border passage, and therefore, the evasion of migratory obligations, which included the undocumented and smuggling of the agricultural hand in Honduras and the flight of judicial defendants; the available data was precarious, which made it difficult to implement public policies to combat migration; mutual intolerance and xenophobia, created by irresponsible propaganda; the asymmetry in economic development, since El Salvador had a higher level of infrastructure, and Honduras requested preferential treatment in the FTAs and the Central American Integration Plan, due to an unfavorable balance of payments. (Nunfio, 1970); In January 1969, Honduras refused to renew the Migration Agreement with Honduras; The clashes on the soccer field were the root of the extreme exaltation of nationalism in both governments, which managed to increase the tension. (Alcantara, 1980)

Thus, when the affront between the parties began, it implied the effort of other countries in the region for peaceful mediation, suggesting the military forces to stay at least 5 km away from the border. Proposal that was not accepted by El Salvador, because on July 14, 1969, it attacked Honduras, creating a short-lived war, which took place both by air and land, and which left around 300,000 people affected.

On July 18, the OAS ordered a ceasefire with the unanimity of the members of the Council, in addition to the cessation of nationalist propaganda. In successive days, the Organization managed to carry out conversations where both countries established their

positions: On the one hand, El Salvador asked for the guarantee of security for its citizens, while Honduras requested the withdrawal of the invading troops. On July 15, 1970, the OAS closed its activity, after establishing a security zone between the countries, which spanned 3 kilometers on each side of 'an indefinite traditional line', where forces of any kind could not be maintained by either of the two countries (Alcantara, 1980). Although the OAS participated in the process between 1969 and 1980, the Final Peace Treaty had multiple turning points and difficulties. The establishment of the Group of Military Observers made up of multiple Central and South American countries had to defend the object of maintaining peace, verifying compliance with guarantees and the return of occupied lands.

However, despite the internal political situation and provocations that occurred during the eleven years it took for signing a General Peace Treaty, finally, in 1980, the States gave green light to the claims of multiple countries. Specially from the OAS, which was the main external contributor to the agreement, for which, according to Arancibia (2016), both countries were able to resolve old conflicts and improve their bilateral relations. In this way, it is possible to denote that the role played by the OAS was fundamental in solving the differences between Honduras and El Salvador, since without its mediation and the pressure generated by other countries in the region, it is likely that they would continue with their border dispute. Therefore, the participation of the international community and the legitimacy that countries can offer could determine, in certain cases, the avoidance of war costs, especially in terms of human lives.

As we can see, the inequality of internal conditions in both countries was something that could create the conflict. In fact, the conflict was based on a border dispute, but this issue expanded, and some consequences were the problems of migration and the violation of human rights because of war and a profound nationalism that affected Salvadorian migrants in Honduras. Based on this, the following research question arises: What was the contribution of organizations and other international actors in terms of migration and human rights in the development of the process towards the General Peace Treaty between Honduras and El Salvador that ended the conflict of 1969-1980?

Objectives

General Objective

Establish the incidence or contributions of the organizations and other international actors in terms of migration and human rights to the development of the process towards the General Peace Treaty between Honduras and El Salvador, which ended the conflict and tensions of 1969-1980.

Specific Objectives

- Analyze how was the process towards the Peace Treaty and the Role of organizations and other international actors in the peaceful conclusion of the conflict in Honduras and El Salvador between 1969 and 1980.
- Establish which were the specific actions that organizations and countries take in terms of human rights in the development of the peace treaty.
- Develop the actions of organizations and countries in terms of migration in the framework of the peace treaty.

Literature Review

In July 1969, the so-called “One Hundred Hour War” took place. According to Arancibia (2016) and Nanfio (1970), it took place, to some extent, thanks to the uneven growth of the economies of both countries because of the CACM; this created a disadvantageous exchange, due to the decrease in the export of agricultural products to El Salvador and the arrival of Salvadoran migrants to Honduras due to the unequal agrarian structure of their country, for which they considered that migrating would offer them new opportunities. Despite the initial acceptance of immigrants by Honduras, the situation became unsustainable, then, the expulsion began, escalating an already existing conflict, thanks to the claim of territory by Honduras, to carry out the Agrarian Reform, and the allegation of Salvador regarding the breach of the Regional Treaty of the CACM, which guaranteed labor mobility in the region. (Arancibia, 2016)

In the 1960s, inter-Central American trade and political relations were being strengthened by the establishment of the regional integration paradigm. On the one hand, the political dimension occurred within the framework of the Organization of Central American States (ODECA), created in 1951. While the economic dimension involved the creation, in 1960, of the Central American Common Market (CACM). Together, these organizations intended to implement people transit facilities, cultural exchanges, increase the free market and the creation of a uniform Central American tariff (Aguilera, 2016). But the CACM did not comply with its objective, because, despite a success in economic growth, there was little progress in social terms. In this sense, the region had already made similar efforts to achieve a high level of integration, which had been hampered by internal conditions in the countries and frictions for migration and violation of human rights. This time, it was no exception:

Differences on immigration issues and border disputes between El Salvador and Honduras escalated to a war situation between the two countries in 1969. That conflict paralyzed the development of ODECA and affected, though not destroyed, the CACM. (Aguilera, 2016, p.94)

While the regional institutions were in crisis, El Salvador requested the OAS to force Honduras to reach a negotiated solution. Acting in accordance with its principles of international law and establishing the aggression as a threat to other American States and the peaceful resolution of conflicts, the organization accepted ODECA's mediation and agreed to allow the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) to review the claims made by the countries. (Arancibia, 2016; Pérez, 2008; Aguilera, 2016 & Overall, 2004)

In this way, the OAS established a zone for the purpose of pacification on June 4, 1970 signed in San Jose, Costa Rica, which would allow the resumption of activities, with the guarantee of Guatemala, Nicaragua and Costa Rica and its implementation thanks to the supervision of OAS Military Observers, but without affecting the territorial claims (Sierra, 2002 & Bologna, 1978). But observers were not a solution, because there were confrontations and territorial violations that involved guerrilla groups. For this reason, in 1976 the Managua Act was signed, committing both nations to comply with the San Jose Agreement and withdraw troops from potential combat sites. (Varas, 2006 & Arancibia, 2016).

On the other hand, the United States used its soft power to influence the OAS. The representation of the US was based on its influence in the OAS and its tradition of intervention in the region. Furthermore, the country's position was subjective and arbitrary, as

it blocked the OAS attempt to establish sanctions against El Salvador as a result of its obvious aggression against Honduras. The pillar on which Washington based this intervention in the organization's decision was the fact that, if sanctions were established, the Salvadoran population, could begin to show their dissatisfaction with the organization through the creation of left movements that questioned the scope of the conflict, and this entire situation within the context of the Cold War. (Alcantara, 1980)

As we talked about some of the international actors, we got to consider the actions they took to give a solution on the problems of migration and human rights that the conflict presented. In terms of human rights, the main organization involved was the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), that, when the OAS called the attention over the countries to suspend the hostilities on 15th July, was already acting in the zone. (Bologna, 1978).

The truth is that one of the reasons why the conflict escalated was mainly a migration issue. Honduras, which was carrying out an agrarian reform, was trying to transfer responsibility for the country situation to the migration of Salvadorans; Meanwhile, El Salvador, which had interests opposed to the interests of its own people - which involved the landowner sector - did not want to accept that around 100,000 citizens would return to the country.

The agrarian reform of 1969 in Honduras began with the lands of the Salvadorans, taking away the possibility of obtaining a plot. However, this problem had several ramifications: More than 250,000 Salvadorans were living in Honduras, of whom a small part was legally in the country; In 1962, El Salvador and Honduras signed a Convention (after the Honduran Agrarian Reform Law) to legalize the status of Salvadorans. This decision was intended to be a solution to the migration problem, and it concluded with the signing of the Migration Treaty in December 1965. However, the measures taken to prevent this problem from spilling over were insufficient and ineffective for the solution of the divergences between the two countries. (Alcantara, 1980)

Thus, 4 years later and with a reform to be carried out, in January 1969, Honduras opposed the renewal of the Migration Treaty, appealing that the borders between the countries should be defined (Carias, 1970). From that moment and coinciding with the beginning of the application of the agrarian reform measures in Honduras, the exodus of these to their country began, considering that until the end of June of 1969, around 18,000 had returned (Alcantara, 1980).

In this sense, the Honduran landowners were interested in worsening the situation of the Salvadorans or the so-called "Salvadoran question", for them to be massively expelled, as a safety valve that would pacify the conflicts in the countryside (Alcantara, 1980). This, since migrants were involved in the stagnation of the workforce in Honduras, blocked work for Hondurans, and also, their work was better paid. From this, the landowners would benefit from the reform, which would affect the work of Salvadorans, and from the hand of a media campaign led by Honduras, which aimed to awaken nationalism and make the eviction process easier. With which, a cause that was common to those who cultivated the land turned into a problem of migration and xenophobia.

However, it was not in the interest of El Salvador to receive its citizens, since, according to Rivera (1971), "Salvadoran oligarchy saw the danger of adding 100,000 more

unemployed to those already existing and saw in the war the only way to stop that immigration, exhausted other means. This is the trigger for the invasion."

In this order of ideas, we must consider the human rights violations that occurred during the conflict between El Salvador and Honduras, as these had as their root a migration problem that had developed many years before the confrontation.

While the situation was at a fever pitch, on July 10, the OAS met to address Honduras' complaint regarding the acts of hostility by El Salvador. This requested that the Organ of consultation to be convened, however, this did not happen, the mediators were not trusted, and both countries began a total military mobilization. In this sense, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) was deployed on the zone, alongside with the OAS Research Studies Commission, but their actions came late and failed to prevent the armed conflict. (Arancibia, 2016 and Bologna, 1978)

On July 15, the OAS Council as a consultative body urged hostilities to be suspended, and the things must be restored to the state they were in before, and that the necessary measures must be taken to restore inter-American peace and security and for the peaceful resolution of the conflict. This resolution was complied with by Honduras on July 16. The OAS Council once again insisted on the ceasefire on July 18. (Bologna, 1978)

The main violation of Human Rights occurred in the context of Salvadoran migrants in Honduras: Firstly, they began to return to their country because of the agrarian reform that the Honduran government was preparing in 1969, where the art. 68 established that Honduran nationality was a requirement to obtain a plot of land, so their work was affected, then, they had to return to their country. As of July 1969, around 18,000 Salvadorans had returned to their homeland. But what most affected them was not the eviction, but the treatment they had been subjected to. According to the preliminary report of the OAS Subcommittee on Human Rights, the eviction of undocumented Salvadoran emigrants led to the persecution and mistreatment of that minority; Secondly, violent encounters were recorded during the development of the soccer games for the 70th World Cup qualify because, in the report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, there is talk of unpleasant episodes in the first match, and acts of violence and offenses against the national symbol of Honduras in the second game, which included serious incidents against players and supporters of the Honduran team, an event that would have occurred previously in Honduras, but to a lesser extent. (Arancibia, 2016)

In this way, Honduras turned to the IACHR, asking it to investigate the violations committed against its compatriots in El Salvador. The press increased the pressure, while Honduras carried out a provocative action to create nationalism, which had an immediate consequence, since the Salvadoran immigrants were attacked by different popular paramilitary groups, such as "La Mancha Brava" and the Special Corps of Security (kind of rural police). This affected the exodus back to their country to a greater extent and increased anti-Honduran sentiment, which worsened with the third soccer match, since on June 27, it was characterized by the fact that El Salvador broke diplomatic relations with Honduras (Arancibia, 2016 and Alcantara, 1980).

Finally, the demographic problem of the conflict was expressed in resolution II issued by the OAS: "Request that international organs, agencies, and entities, especially the inter-American system, cooperate with both parties in solving their demographic and development

problems." This should be considered important since it is established as the first time that an international organization admits that population problems can be the causes of international conflict, contemplating the coordination of organizations to contribute to the solution of these problems (Bologna, 1978).

Despite the difficulties and continuous scenarios of territorial violation and the agreement established with the OAS, the General Treaty of Peace El Salvador-Honduras, was signed in Lima on October 30, 1980, and despite not solving all the problems between the countries, the delimitation of the traditional land boundaries was achieved. However, the border conflict resurfaced in 1986, but, on September 11, 1992, the land, insular and maritime borders were defined by the International Court of Justice, in a definitive, invariable, and perpetual way, between the countries of Honduras and El Salvador. (Sierra, 2002).

Additionally, the resolution regarding the migration problem and the violation of human rights was consigned in the final Agreement of 1980, in title VII, Art. 43:

“Each Party undertakes, concerning the nationals of the other, to respect and protect the rights and essential freedoms of the human person, to guarantee their free and full exercise, and to ensure that they are not violated by authorities, officials or individuals”(General Treaty of Peace between the Republics of Salvador and Honduras, April 7, 1980)

Likewise, Article 44 establishes that, in the first measure, it will respect the rights. Also, the parties will adapt to the Charter of the Organization of American States, the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the American Convention on Human Rights or Pact of San José: In the second instance, the parties will allow residents in their countries from the nationals of the other party and engage in any lawful activity, subject to the regulations that apply to nationals of any other Central American country; Finally, Article 45 requires that the legislation of the parties include the maximum respect for the rights of the nationals of both States.

The following sections will talk about the process that led to peace between El Salvador and Honduras. In this sense, the way in which both countries moved from a clearly realistic logic will be observed, where the warlike conflict prevailed in favor of the national interest; towards a scenario more characterized by liberalism, where international actors intervened and contributed to the peaceful resolution, the protection of human rights and respect for immigrants.

PART I


From 1969 to 1980: A process from realism towards liberalism

From Brecher (1987), the *international system* must be considered from its dynamic and static components. In this sense, it is composed of a *structure*, which implies the number of actors and the distribution of power among them. On the other hand, the *process* implies the interaction networks between the actors of the system. The main variables are the type of interaction given, which is identified from the conflict / cooperation continuum; and the intensity of the interaction, which is translated into the number of interactions given in a specific period. Barbé (1995) establishes that these components are dynamic, as the process, with a wide potential for change and they could affect the structure.

International interactions are “politically relevant processes of communication and exchange between the actors of the international system” (Hocking and Smith, 1990). These interactions are situated on the conflict / cooperation continuum, according to Brecher. This continuum has certain phases, which move between the two fundamental types of interaction: conflict and cooperation. However, the extreme level of these interactions are war and integration, respectively.

The case of Honduras and El Salvador, although it did not escalate internationally in military terms, it turned into an armed conflict. However, when establishing a dialogue and reaching an agreement in 1980, it is considered that it reached a cooperation scenario, in which multiple actors of the system contributed. From this, the continuum theory developed by Brecher can be applied, thanks to the fact that the Treaty, which took eleven years to be developed and signed, went through a process in which the parties changed their positions, and the type of interaction they were subject to.

Continuum conflict-cooperation - Brecher



This table denotes the types of interaction that can occur between the actors. Thus, it is established that according to the characteristics of the 4 moments established by Brecher, the war situation occurred only within the framework of the confrontation in July 1969, while a maximum level of conflict was reached and degenerated into the armed struggle. Within the framework of this struggle, the bases of *political realism* are established as the main theory to explain the beginning of the conflict.

Morgenthau (2005), as the main exponent of the theory, helps us shed light on this matter, around the characteristics that it defines about realism. On the one hand, the central problem is considered to be the defense of national security. The interests between El Salvador and Honduras were exclusive as a result of the territorial expansion that El Salvador wanted to achieve, and the military deployment of Honduras in order to survive amid hostility and the threat to its territorial sovereignty, which already implies the maintenance or obtaining of power over the interests of the other; On the other hand, the anarchy of the system is denoted in how the countries, despite belonging to common organizations (OAS, CACM) and having treaties that regulated their relationship (Migration Treaty of 1965), decided to protect the country's own interests to the detriment of international law and cooperation. However, it must be taken into account that El Salvador found itself mostly in

the realistic position, inasmuch as it violated international law and the sovereignty of its counterpart at the time it decided to attack.

During the following years, until it was decided to sign the agreement, a situation of relative calm can be established, which is located in the zone of a conflict in terms of discord. This absence of conflict occurs within the framework of mediation by neighboring states, but mainly through the action of the OAS and the IACHR, who played an important role in maintaining peace. In this sense, it is no longer considered that realism explains this situation, since "realists consider the State as the main actor ... they do not believe in international law or in international organization as a mechanism of order" (Maghroori and Ramberg, 1982). Therefore, neoliberal institutionalism can be considered to explain this transition towards the peace treaty. This consideration, given that Keohane (1988) "the institutionalization of world politics has a significant effect on the behavior of governments". Initially, it is established that the States are at the center of the analysis, however, the agreements prevail and affect state actions. Thus, the transition period, which can be considered between 1969 and 1980 has the characteristic that incompatibilities persist, but with the mediation of organizations and the establishment of observation missions to maintain stability at the border, and the fact that both governments followed the recommendations of the OAS and created different agreements such as the San José agreement and the Managua Act that demanded compliance with the same in the midst of tensions in the mid-1970s.

Finally, by 1980, when cooperation between both countries reaches a peak, the agreement is signed, thus highlighting the plurality of actors, thanks to the participation of a multiplicity of international agents, and the generation of a context for joint progress and potential cooperation (Jervis, 1999). In the treaty, the borders around the conflict produced are defined, and multiple characteristics of liberalism are highlighted such as free transit, the reestablishment of diplomatic and consular relations between countries, peaceful settlement of disputes through the International Court of Justice, human rights, migration and multilateral agreements.

PART II

The international characteristic of the conflict

Kalyvas (2003) considers that "External intervention is possible only when domestic factions and individuals are willing and able to make an appeal to external agents." Borda (2012) defines this participation as '*internationalization of the conflict*', in which the parties decide to explicitly include international actors in the negotiation of a conflict. In this sense, two types of internationalization can be established: The military, which seeks to obtain material resources for the continuation of the war; or politics, based on international legitimacy and political support that implies an immaterial resource to defend against the threat.

However, another reason why the conflict could be internationalized is a decision taken by external agents, where internationalization turns into invasion, and where they can influence both directly and indirectly as a result of diverse interests (humanitarian action, economic interests, geostrategic, etc.)(Borda, 2012 and Trujillo, 2012)

In the Salvador-Honduras conflict, these two types of intervention were presented. Initially, there is a political internationalization, since Honduras - which can be considered

the most rational actor - resorted to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the OAS, at the time when hostilities took place in the framework of the 70's World Cup qualifiers. In addition, when on July 27 El Salvador decided to break its relations with Honduras, a Commission of Foreign Ministers of Costa Rica, Guatemala and Nicaragua met in order to provide a peaceful mediation, which was accepted by the countries in conflict. Together with the mediating organizations and countries, the main activity was based on establishing border limits, ensuring a ceasefire, avoiding new confrontations, and creating observation missions for the maintenance of peace.

At the other extreme are US stocks. As previously established, the country intervened indirectly, so that the OAS sanctions against El Salvador were not given as punishment for the attack in Honduras. This intervention, as a result of the US believing that illegal groups with ideologies opposed to the OAS could arise, as a sign of disagreement with the international community. In addition, El Salvador alleged that the CACM Regional Treaty, which allowed labor mobilization, was not being complied with, thus, a new reason for discontent with international organizations.

In this sense, the position of both actors in the system is also denoted. On one side, Honduras considered it pertinent to not signing again an agreement that was affecting the flow of migrants to the country, and although this caused an exodus of Salvadorans, the truth is that Honduras respected International Law; when hostilities occurred, he opted for the mediation of the IACHR, he complied with the calls for a ceasefire made by the OAS and did not affect the territorial sovereignty of Salvador. However, with the objective of territorial expansion and an interest in not receiving thousands of nationals in the country, El Salvador violated territorial sovereignty and it took time to comply with the calls of the OAS, so it can be classified as the more hostile actor and at an extreme of political realism.

PART III

Human rights and migration

Regarding human rights, in the context of the Honduras-El Salvador conflict, they can be understood from the family of political concepts known as '*right of peoples*' defined by John Rawls (1999), who contributes to liberalism from philosophy. This is considered since the principles of the law of nations are formed from the demands given between the representatives of the Nations. Thus, among these principles are equality among peoples, self-determination, the *pacta sunt servanda* (respect for treaties), *jus ad bellum* (limits to the use of force between States) and *jus in bellum* (Regulation of hostilities between States). Therefore, while Honduras and El Salvador were signatory countries of the United Nations Charter in 1945, these types of principles had to be respected within the framework of international law. However, it is considered that the OAS, the IACHR and the Central American countries that served as mediators, were the ones who achieved that, after a confrontation, these principles were fulfilled, as the tensions developed during 11 years of the process towards an agreement, although they recreated confrontations, these were not between the military forces of the two countries, but with paramilitary groups and guerrillas inserted in the border.

On the other hand, Rawls establishes that the war has justification only in defense cases, which is true in the case of Honduras since, on the one hand, its citizens were attacked

by the Salvadoran people, and their territorial sovereignty was affected when El Salvador decided to carry out an armed incursion. The right of countries to self-defense is even established in the United Nations letter, "The States shall refrain from resorting to the threat or use of force ... This principle may be exceptional in cases of self-defense" (Charter of the United Nations).

However, the right of nations was disrespected by Honduras, while Salvadoran immigrants in the country, specifically in the eighth principle, where it is defined that "The peoples have an obligation to assist other peoples who live under unfavorable conditions. that prevent them from having a just or decent political and social order" (Rawls, 1999), because, in this sense, Honduras did not contribute to the Salvadorans achieving a better quality of life, and even, through the implementation of the reform agrarian, prevented them from accessing a plot, and therefore, an income.

Regarding emigration, it must be understood that it is recognized as a human right, established in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights "everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country" (Article 13 -two). In this sense, John Rawls's theory of distributive justice contributes to shedding light on the role of borders and, therefore, the mediation of international actors in the case of Honduras and El Salvador. Initially, distributive justice must be observed from a liberal perspective, in which equality of opportunities is fundamental and where borders and migration play an important role. In this sense, this phenomenon must be understood from normativity, which implies a morally problematic vision, as a result of the fact that equality of opportunities can be affected in certain societies, because they are reduced or have little value. (Loewe, 2017)

In this way, it is denoted in the case of El Salvador, where opportunities were reduced, despite the progress of the country. This, due to the inequality in terms of agrarian structure. In this sense, the signing of the migration treaty in 1965 was the opening for equal opportunities, however, 4 years later, it would be denoted that in itself, migration to other countries does not allow the correct development of this equality, since the legislation of Honduras and the agrarian reform that would be carried out, took away the opportunity for Salvadorans to obtain and work the land, which is why they had to return to their country. Years later, with the signing of the peace treaty, in article 44, it would be established that nationals of the other country would abide by the same conditions as any other foreigner in order to settle in the host country, reestablishing equal opportunities in Honduras for Salvadorans.

The international mediation of the OAS, who would be one of the main actors, would demonstrate that migration was a central problem for the resolution of this conflict, as the existence of a demographic conflict is recognized.

Conclusion

From this peace process, many things can be concluded. Firstly, the fact that the country's internal political, economic, historical, and social dimensions have a broad influence on the development of foreign relations, especially by establishing resentments as a result of the disparities created by the incidence of the international community in bilateral affairs. Additionally, it should be established that not only do decisions taken abroad affect the actions of governments, but that the internal policies of a country have consequences for

the region to which they belong, and even for the organizations in which they are committed. Therefore, by violating what is signed in an agreement, the organization loses credibility, and in the case of Honduras and El Salvador, enter an armed conflict had the capacity to directly and indirectly involve the OAS, CACM, the IACHR, countries of the region and affect the interests of a country like the United States.

Secondly, it is necessary to highlight the role of regional and international organizations in maintaining order and stability in the community, in order to avoid warlike conflict and maintain peace, to minimize the costs of war. . The importance of mediators is based on their ability to respond in a timely manner to a crisis, without letting it escalate. In this sense, the organizations and international actors have the capacity to change the kind of interactions that are developed between two or more countries or parts but without affecting their internal capacity and sovereignty. But this study also shows the huge intervention that the US was making in Latin America during the Cold War, and the way the organizations contributed to this dynamic, even when the main principles of liberalism were not being complied. For this reason, the independence of organizations must be understood as the participation of multiple States that have the same capacity and influence over the decisions taken.

Finally, based on the foregoing speaking in general terms, both countries committed violations of international law and human rights by presenting mutual disrespect between peoples, mainly directed by nationalism and the individual interest of each country. However, in the framework of the process that was developed to obtain the Peace Treaty, individual interests gradually moved towards logic of compliance with treaties and respect for the rights of nations and equal opportunities that underpin the liberalism. This, from the insertion into international society, because of the adoption of a cooperative framework, which includes the other actors of the system in favor of implementing treaties and obligations that lead them to accept joint commitments, which is established in the second principle of Rawls. Thus, it is denoted that there is a presence of liberalism in the framework of this conflict, although taking into account that it was a process in which the actors evolved within the system, moving from a realistic logic, of national security, international system and levels void of cooperation, towards a much more liberal idea, where treaties, respect for other peoples and the establishment of limits and commitments mediated by organizations are necessary to defend the freedoms and rights of the human being.

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